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"THE SINS OF THE SON SHOULD BE VISITED UPON THE
FATHER":' LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA AND
NEW YORK STATE LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the years when lenders have loaned money to borrowers, the
borrower's potential harm to the environment was never considered and
was not an issue in determining whether a loan was to be approved or
denied. Recently, as the dimensions of the hazardous waste problem2 are

becoming more evident, the environmental repo

of a potential borrower

is a major factor when making a loan secured by real property.

This change is primarily due to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 19804 (CERCLA or

Superfund). The Act created a $1.6 billion dollar trust fund' that the

government could use to clean up hazardous substances 6 immediately, and
1. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.R.I. 1989) (holding
parent company liable under CERCLA), aft'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
II1 S. Ct. 957 (1991); cf. Exodus 20:5 (King James) ("[F]or I the Lord thy God am a
") (emphasis in
jealous God, visiting the inequity of the fathers upon the children ....
original).
2. Hazardous waste is produced at the rate of 700,000 tons per day in this country.
That is 250 million tons per year-enough to fill the Superdome in New Orleans 1500
times over. OFFICE OF PUBLUC AFFAIRS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
PAMPHLET NO. OPA-87-007, SUPERFUND: LOOKING BACK, LOOKING AHEAD I (Dec.
1987), reprinted in EPA JOURNAL (Jan.-Feb. 1987) [hereinafter EPA, SUPERFUND].
3. For a further discussion of the environmental report, see Leonard, Conducting
Pre-Acquisition Audits, in NYSBA ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DIUGENCE 297 (1989)
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DIUGENCE].
4. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1988)).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1988), repealed by Superfund Amendments Reauthorization Act
of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988).
6. Hazardous substances are defined under CERCLA to include the following: (1) any
substance designated under 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A); (2) elements, compounds, mixtures,
solutions and substances designated under 33 U.S.C. § 9602; (3) "hazardous wastes"
identified under § 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (excluding
those of which Congress has suspended regulation under the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k); (4) "toxic pollutants" identified under 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a); (5)
"hazardous air pollutants" defined under § 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412;
and (6) imminently hazardous chemical substances or mixtures that the EPA has taken
action on under 15 U.S.C. § 2606. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). This Note will use the
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then hold the responsible parties liable for the cleanup costs. 7
Alternatively, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may compel
legally responsible parties to clean up a hazardous substance site.'
CERCLA was amended by the Superfund Amendments Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA),9 adding $8.5 billion to the Superfund account to
combat the increasing number of actual and potential Superfund sites.10
The wastes at Superfund sites consist mainly of industrial chemicals
posing various threats to human health and the environment." In most
instances, the contamination at the sites is a result of poor disposal
practices. 12 Thousands of abandoned or inactive sites containing
hazardous waste have been identified across the country. 13 Unfortunately,
many of these sites are located in environmentally sensitive areas, such as
floodplains or wetlands. 4 Consequently, rain and melting snow seep
through the sites, carrying away chemicals that contaminate streams,

terms hazardous and toxic interchangeably, as well as substance and waste. But see Stevens
Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (hazardous substance
does not include asbestos products); Wilshire Westwood Assoc. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp.,
881 F.2d 801, 802 n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (hazardous substance does not include petroleum).
7. CERCLA defines responsible parties as (1) present owners or operators of a vessel
or facility; (2) past owners or operators of a facility, who owned the facility at the time
hazardous substances were disposed; (3) those who arrange for the disposal of such waste;
and (4) transporters who selected sites from which there is a release or threatened release
of any hazardous substance which causes the United States government to incur response
costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
8. Id. § 9606. The discretionary functions of the President under subsection (a) of this
section have been delegated to the Administrator of the EPA. Exec. Order No. 12,316, §§
3(b), 8(f), 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981).
9. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1988)).
10. In December 1982, the first National Priorities List (NPL) had a total of 418 sites.
47 Fed. Reg. 58,476 (1982). As of October 1989 that number had risen to 981 final sites
plus 238 proposed sites, for a total of 1219. 54 Fed. Reg. 41,000, 41,015 (1989). Once
listed on the NPL, a site is eligible for CERCLA cleanup funds. However, the NPL
contains only those sites which pose the greatest threat to human health and the
environment. The problem is better illustrated by the EPA's hazardous waste site inventory,
which includes approximately 20,000 sites that may pose a threat to human life or the
environment. See CERCZA Enforcement Figures CalledLowfor Fiscal1986, 25 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 473 (Nov. 28, 1986).
11. EPA, SUPEPFUND, supra note 2, at 1.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.

NOTE

lakes, and underground waters. 15
A lender that forecloses on and takes title to the property of a

borrower may be liable for the cost to clean up the hazardous waste17
disposed of by the borrower.16 The costs for a cleanup are substantial.

In the past few years, thirty-nine states have passed legislation similar to
the statutory scheme of CERCLA to aid in the war on hazardous waste.1"

Moreover, five states currently have legislation that allows the imposition

of priority or superliens on the contaminated property.1 9 The state
statutes provide for such liens to supersede existing perfected liens, and

to burden the property of a responsible party that was not the subject of
the cleanup.'
This Note reviews lender liability under CERCLA. 21 It analyzes the
statutory provisions creating secured creditor liability,' and a provision
exempting lenders from liability,' as well as case law interpreting those
provisions. u In addition, it discusses proposed legislation to address the

predicament faced by lenders.'
The Note also examines the statutes2 and case law27 of New York

State, including the implications of proposed superlien legislation.?

15. Id.
16. See infra notes 58-109 and accompanying text.
17. For example, the Singer Corporation spent $1.2 million to remove polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) from the New Jersey site where it had manufactured sewing machines for

over a century. EPA,

SUPERFUND,

supra note 2, at 20.

18. For a list of the 39 states who have enacted Superfund-type legislation, see Note,
The Impact of State "Superlien" Statutes on Real Estate Transactions, 5 VA. J. NAT.
RESOURCES L. 297, 297 n. 1 (1986).
19. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-451, -452a (1985 & Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 13 (West Supp. 1990);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f,
subd. f. (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). Arkansas and Tennessee repealed the superpriority
provisions of their lien laws, leaving only a nonpriority environmental lien. Hamel, Is the
Great Superlien Scare Finally Over?, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 853, 853 (Aug. 31, 1990).
20. See infra notes 143-73 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 30-109 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 58-109 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 186-98 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 110-29 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 143-64 and accompanying text.
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Finally, it concludes by setting forth precautions a lender may take to

avoid liability when dealing with debtors' facilities that are contaminated
with hazardous substances.9
II. LABILiTY UNDER CERCLA

A. Statutory Scheme
CERCLA imposes strict liability" based on standards under the
Clean Water Act of 1977. 31 The courts have generally held that a
CERCLA defendan 2 may be held jointly and severally liable for EPA
cleanup costs.'u As a result, the EPA may go after any single liable
party, realistically the one with the "deepest pockets," which typically
includes lenders. Though a CERCLA defendant may implead other
responsible parties, it will bear the burden and cost of doing so.'
The basis for the liability of lenders is CERCLA section 107(a). 5
Superfund imposes liability on four groups of parties: present owners

29. See infra notes 174-98 and accompanying text.
30. Although the language of CERCLA itself does not impose strict liability, it has
been interpreted to do so. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (Congress intended responsible parties to be held strictly liable);
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (strict
liability standard is consistent with legislative intent); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem.
Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (quoting remarks of Sen. Randolph and
Rep. Florio from Congressional Record to demonstrate Congress' intent to impose strict
liability).
31. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988).
32. The term "CERCLA defendant" is used in this Note to indicate a party the court
deems responsible for cleaning up a contaminated site.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1083-84 n.9 (D.
Colo. 1985) (joint and several liability under common law principles may be imposed on
a case-by-case basis); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256
(S.D. M. 1984) (a court has the power to impose joint and several liability whenever a
defendant cannot prove his contribution to an injury).
34. There is legislative history which indicates the rationale for imposing joint and
several liability:
[Tihe effect of the decision was to require the defendants, rather than the
plaintiff, to show that other tortfeasors contributed to the harm and in what
quantities they so contributed. This incentive to locate all responsible parties is
one of the prime considerations underlying use of joint and several liability in
pollution suits.
126 CONG. REC. 26,784 (1980) (statement of Rep. Gore).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
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and/or operators of the vessels or facilities,' past owners and/or
operators of facilities, 37 those who arrange for the transportation of
hazardous substances ,3 and the transporters of such materials.3 9 The
term "owner and operator" of a facility is defined as "any person owning
or operating such facility."" Nevertheless, the same section goes on to
provide: "[s]uch [a] term does not include a person, who, without
participating in the management of a . . . facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the. .. facility." 41
This section is commonly known as the "secured lender exemption
clause."

B. Secured Lender Exemption
A person who satisfies the requirements of the secured lender
exemption clause is not liable under the Act. Consequently, lenders have
argued that they acquired the toxic property to protect their security
interest 2 and are not liable because of this clause.' The legislative
history indicates that this exemption is to apply only under certain
circumstances."4 The Act does not encompass certain persons possessing
ownership (such as financial institutions) who, without participating in the
management or operation of a vessel or facility, hold title to secure a loan.
Also exempted are those individuals whose participation is limited to
holding lease financing arrangements.4 5 Thus, a distinction is drawn
between ownership of land versus ownership of a mortgage. The secured
lender exemption clause ensures that all lenders will be treated the same

36. Id. § 9607(a)(1).
37. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
38. Id. § 9607(a)(3).

39. Id.§ 9607(a)(4).
40. Id. § 9601(20)(A).
41. Id.
42. The term security interest is used to mean an interest in real or personal property
which secures the payment of an obligation. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1989). The Uniform
Commercial Code treats all secured interests in personal property simply as "security
interests." See id. § 9-102.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Maryland Bank &Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573,578-80
(D. Md. 1986); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994,
20,996 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
44. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6181.
45. Id.
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under the conflicting state laws. A mortgage does not convey title to the
land in lien theory states.' In contrast, title theory states convey
ownership when the lender takes a security interest.47
The secured lender exemption was significantly narrowed by the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.41 The

court stated:
Under the standard we adopt today, a secured creditor may incur
section 9607(a)(2) liability, without being an operator, by
participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree
indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of
hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor
actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the
facility in order to be liable ....

I

As the Supreme Court denied certiorari,' it remains to be seen how
other courts will construe and limit this exemption.
C. Affirmative Defenses
Even though courts have interpreted CERCLA to impose strict
liability,51 three affirmative defenses are available to a CERCLA
defendant.5 2 Liability will not be imposed if the defendant can
demonstrate that the contamination was caused by an act of God, an act
of war, or an act of a third party, other than an agent of the defendant,
and other than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, if the defendant establishes that he exercised due

care and took precautions to guard against foreseeable acts or omissions

of the third party.53 The first two defenses, by their nature, are clear and

46. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 589 n.10 (2d ed. 1988). In lien theory
states, the borrower retains legal title and the lender has only a lien on the property. Id.
47. Id. In title theory states, the borrower gives the deed in fee simple to the lender,
with a condition subsequent clause providing that if the borrower pays back the sum owed
on the due date, the deed will become void. Id. at 589.
48. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991); see infra
notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
49. Id.
50. 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
51. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
53. Id. Nor will liability be imposed if the damage results from any combination of
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used only in limited circumstances. It is the latter that has caused much
confusion. SARA, however, added a lengthy description of the phrase
"contractual relationship,"- which created the "innocent landowner"
defense.5
A "contractual relationship" includes, "but is not limited to, land
56
contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title or possession."
However, a contractual relationship will not exist if the property where the
facility is located was acquired by the defendant after the contamination
occurred and, if at the time the property was acquired, the defendant did
not know or have reason to know the property contained hazardous
substances. 57
If the defendant discovers the contamination after taking ownership of
the property, he is put in a formidable situation. The defendant may not
use the innocent landowner defense when transferring the property despite
the fact that he did not cause the contamination. Therefore, he will be
liable if he does not disclose, and if he does disclose, he will arguably
have a difficult time selling the tainted property.
D. Case Law
United States v. Mirabile" held that a secured creditor is not liable
for Superfund cleanup costs if he does not participate in the management
of the facility. Mirabile was an action brought by the EPA for 'the
recovery of $249,792.52 spent in removing 550 drums of hazardous waste
from the site of an insolvent paint manufacturing business.59 The EPA
filed its claim against Anna and Thomas Mirabile, the owners of the site
at that time. The Mirabiles joined American Bank, claiming that they were
potentially responsible parties under CERCLA.W

these causes. Id.
54. Id. § 9601(35)(A).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.§ 9601(35)(A)(i).
58. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985). See also In re T.P.
Long Chem. Co., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). The bank which held a security
interest in the contaminated property was found not liable because it did not benefit from
the cleanup and did not participate in the management of the property. The court found that
the bank already suffered a loss and felt that it was inequitable for the bank to bear an even
larger loss. Id. at 288-89.
59. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,993.
60. Id. at 20,996.
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In the 1970s, American Bank made a loan to Turco Coatings, Inc.
(Turco) that was secured in part by a mortgage on the site. During the
course of manufacturing paint, Turco had generated hazardous waste that
was stored in drums on the site.61 Turco continued to manufacture paint
until 1980, when it filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code.'
In 1981, Turco's Chapter 11 petition was dismissed, and American
Bank initiated a foreclosure action. American Bank was the highest bidder
at the sheriff's sale held on August 21, 1981.1 On December 15, 1981,
American Bank assigned its bid to the Mirabiles who accepted a sheriff's
deed to the property.'
Throughout the four months between the sheriff's sale and the
assignment to the Mirabiles, American Bank officials visited the property
several times to show it to prospective buyers. Additionally, the bank took
steps to protect the property against vandalism.'
To determine if the bank had exercised enough control in the
management of the property to impose liability, in Mirabile the court
looked at cases that addressed whether an individual hazardous waste site
owner could hide behind a corporate veil.' In those cases, the courts
held that if stockholders were active in the management of the corporation
creating
toxic waste, such stockholders may be held liable for the cleanup
67
costs.

The Mirabile court drew a distinction between creditors who focused
solely on financial matters of the corporation and those creditors who also6
participated in the "day-to-day production aspects of the business."
Finding that the bank was only involved in the financial aspects of the
business, the court granted its motion for summary judgment. ' From the
Mirabile decision, however, it remains unclear how much control a lender

61. Id.
62. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
63. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 20,995. In the cases discussed, the court imposed personal liability on
individuals active in corporate management and control. See New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699 (D.S.C. 1984).
67. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1032; Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,699.
68. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995.
69. Id. at 20,996.
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can maintain over the borrower's business while still avoiding liability.
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. ,' a federal district
court in Maryland avoided the management participation issue by holding
a lender liable when it foreclosed on a loan and took title to the
contaminated property. 71 The court held that the secured lender
exemption did not apply once the lender foreclosed and took title to the
property. 72
Maryland Bank involved a 117 acre farm in California, Maryland
owned by Herschel McLeod and his wife.' The McLeods operated two
trash and garbage disposal businesses at the site.7' During the 1970s
Maryland Bank & Trust Co. loaned money to the McLeods for their
business operations.75 In 1980, their son, Mark, borrowed $335,000
from Maryland Bank to buy the family farm. In 1981, Mark McLeod
defaulted on the loan, and Maryland Bank began the foreclosure
process. 76 On May 15, 1982, Maryland Bank purchased the property at
a foreclosure sale.77
In June 1983, the EPA inspected the site and found improperly
disposed hazardous waste that had been there since approximately 1972.78
The EPA ordered the bank to clean up the area. When the bank refused,
the EPA began removing the wastes. 79 The United States filed suit when
Maryland Bank refused to reimburse the EPA for the $551,713.50
incurred as response costs to the hazardous waste problem.80
The court focused on whether Maryland Bank was an "owner and
operator" under CERCLA.81 The court felt the statute was unclear about

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
Id. at 579.
Id.
Id. at 575.
Id.

75. Id.
76. Id.

77. Id.
78. The EPA inspection revealed two disposal areas containing deteriorated or leaking

drums, some of which had been buried. Testing identified several hazardous substances
including: chromium, lead, mercury, cyanide compounds, ethylbenzene, toluene, and
xylenes. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 65,847 (1985).
79. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 575.
80. Id. at 576.
81. Id. at 578-80.
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whether persons had to be both owners and operators to be held liable. 2
Since CERCLA was a quickly drafted compromise statute,3 the court
reasoned that it was highly probable that Congress forgot to put a "the"
before the term "operator" as it had before "owner."" As a result, the
court found that a defendant need not be both an owner and operator to be
held liable under CERCLA.1
Maryland Bank also claimed that it was simply protecting its security
interest and was therefore entitled to the secured lender exemption. The
court disagreed, stating that the security interest exemption covered only
those persors who hold a security interest at the time of the cleanup.86
Since Maryland Bank did not hold the requisite security interest at the
time of the cleanup, it was not entitled to the exemption.8 7 The court
reasoned that allowing Maryland Bank to escape liability would go against
the policy of CERCLA. 5 If Maryland Bank's argument prevailed, it
would mean that it could sell the land for a profit after the EPA paid to
clean it up.'
In addition to MarylandBank, other cases have interpreted CERCLA
to impose liability on lenders. A federal district court in South Carolina
held a finance company liable for cleanup costs despite its holding title for
only one hour.' In New Mexico, a federal district court imposed liability
on a lessor of property, holding him responsible for the hazardous waste
of his tenant. 91

82. Id. at 578.
83. 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6119-20; Gurd, A Legislative
History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superf nd") Act of 1980, 8 J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (1982).
84. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 578.
85. Id. at 577.
86. Id. at 579.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 580.
89. Id.
90. United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699
(D.S.C. 1984). The EPA sued the defendant to recover cleanup costs of a hazardous site
in Fort Lawn, South Carolina. The defendant, who acted as a strawman for transfer of
property between two other defendants, was held liable because it had retained an
ownership interest in the property after the transfer. Id. at 20,699-700.
91. United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354 (D.N.M. 1984).
The EPA cleaned up the leased property after a spill occurred. The court relied on the
legislative history of CERCLA in holding the lessor liable as an owner. The lessor's third
party act or omission defense was held to be inapplicable because the lessor and lessee were
in a contractual arrangement (the lease). Id. at 1358.
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United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.' is one of the more recent cases
regarding CERCLA lender liability.' Fleet Factors Corporation (Fleet)
loaned money to Swainsboro Print Works, Inc. (SPW) from 1976 to 1981,
secured by security interests in inventory, equipment and a mortgage on
the plant property.'" During that period, Fleet approved SPW's
customers' credit prior to shipment of goods, and applied a portion of the
sales income to the debt.95 SPW went bankrupt in 1981, and Fleet
foreclosed its security interest on the inventory and equipment, but not on
the real property.'
In denying the government's motion for summary judgment,' the
court divided Fleet's activities into two periods:9" the time prior to the
foreclosure, and the time after the foreclosure sale.' The court ruled as
a matter of law that Fleet was not a "current owner or operator" because
Fleet did not foreclose on the mortgage of the property, just on the
equipment and inventory." ° In deciding whether Fleet was an owner or
operator at the time the toxic waste was disposed, the court interpreted the
secured lender exemption of section 9601(20)(A) to mean that
the phrases "participating in the management of a . . . facility"
and "primarily to protect his security interest," to permit secured
creditors to provide financial assistance and general, and even
isolated instances of specific, management advice to its debtors
without risking CERCLA liability if the secured creditor does not

92. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), af'd, 901 F.2d. 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 752 (1991).
93. There since have been additional cases that follow the Fleet Factors decision. See,
e.g., In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990) (secured creditor
participating only in the financial management is not excluded from secured lender
exemption); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 553 (W.D. Pa.
1989) ("when a lender is the successful purchaser at a foreclosure sale, the lender should
be liable to the same extent as any other bidder at the sale would have been."). See also
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (mortgagee can
be held liable under CERCLA only if the mortgagee participates in the managerial and
operational aspects of the facility in question).
94. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 957.
95. Id.at 958.
96. Id.
97. Id.at 961.
98. Id.at 960-61.
99. Id.at 960.
100. Id.
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participate in the day-to-day management of the business or
facility ....

0'

Applying this analysis, the court ruled that Fleet's activities 1" prior
to foreclosure did not rise to the level of an owner or operator. 103 The
court, however, denied Fleet's motion for summary judgment. 04 In
doing so, it focused on the activities at the time of foreclosure and
afterward at the auction sale, concluding that an issue of material fact
existed about whether Fleet actually caused the hazardous chemicals to be
released during the auction sale.1 5 This would make Fleet an operator
of the facility at the time of disposal of the hazardous waste. 106
This decision is in line with Mirabile.17 It allows a lender to
provide financial assistance and management advice to a debtor without
incurring CERCLA liability. However, just as in Mirabile, the Fleet
Factors court is not clear about what would constitute "day-to-day"
business activities. Moreover, lenders must note that the Fleet Factors
court was willing to expose Fleet to liability based on its activities on the
property during the foreclosure which may have caused chemicals and
dyes to leak from the fifty-five gallon drums. 08 Additionally, in
affirming the district court's decision, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the
district court construed the secured creditor exemption too broadly."
III. LIABILITY UNDER STATE LAW

A. New York State Law and Cases
In recognizing the great danger to the public posed by hazardous
waste, one New York court noted that "[t]he unlawful possession and
disposal of hazardous wastes, with the long-term toxicity that is inherent
in these substances, may pose a greater threat to the health and safety of

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 960.
Id. at 961.

105. Id.
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
107. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
109. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) ("we
find its construction of the statutory exemption too permissive towards secured creditors
who are involved with toxic waste facilities."), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
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the citizens of this State than street crime."110 In 1981, the state
legislature created a comprehensive criminal enforcement scheme to
increase the sanctions for violations of these laws.' The legislature
amended the Environmental Conservation Law, establishing felony and3
2
misdemeanor offenses for unlawful possession,1 unlawful disposal,"
and unlawful dealing in hazardous wastes." 4 However, those statutes
that impose civil liability are of more interest to lenders.
Three civil titles address the emerging problems of hazardous waste.
One deals with industrial hazardous waste management," 5 another
creates a procedure for reporting hazardous waste treatment," 6 and the
third, title 13, regulates inactive hazardous waste disposal areas." 7 It is
title 13 that is similar to CERCLA and is of the most concern to lending
institutions.
This title establishes a State Superfund Management Board to oversee
the state fund created in 1982 by State Finance Law,"" known as the
Hazardous Waste Remedial Fund (Fund). The Fund, financed by
assessments on hazardous waste generators," 9 is available for cleanup
and remedial programs under title 13.11 The Fund, however, may not
be used to reimburse costs covered by CERCLA.' 2 '
The State Superfund law has two principal components: (1) site
identification and ranking" (site listing); and (2) site remediation.121
The site listing process is relatively informal. The Department of

110. People v. J.R. Cooperage Co., 72 N.Y.2d 579, 581, 531 N.E.2d 1285, 1287,
111. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
112. N.Y. ENVmL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 71-2707, -2709 (McKinne5
1991).
113. Id. §§ 71-2711, -2713.
114. Id. §§ 71-2715, -2717.
115. Id. §§ 27-0900 to -0923.
116. Id. §§ 27-1101 to -1107.
117. Id. §§ 27-1301 to -1321.
118. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 97-b(1) (McKinney 1989).
119. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0923(4)(b) (McKinney 1984

120. Id. § 27-1313.
121. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 97-b (McKinney 1989) (reprinting ]
§ 19, stating that the Fund may not be used to duplicate or cover expenses
by federal law).
122. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1305

123. Id. § 27-1313.
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Environmental Conservation (DEC) has the discretion to classify a
disposal site as a hazard if it believes that the hazardous wastes at the site
present a significant threat to the public health or the environment. 12
Site remediation, however, can be ordered only after a hearing at which
the DEC must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the site is a
significant threat to the public health or the environment. 121 Moreover,
the hearing is necessary before the state can deem a party to be
responsible for the cleanup costs. 12 Title 13 has language similar to the
owner or operator language of CERCLA.1z Under this title the DEC
may
order the owner of such site and/or any person responsible for the
disposal of hazardous wastes at such site (i) to develop an inactive
hazardous waste disposal site remedial program, subject to the
approval of the department, at such site, and (ii) to implement
such program within reasonable time limits specified in the
order. 1
The use of the word "or" would seem to mean that the owner would not
have to be the cause of the hazardous waste to be held liable, but must
simply be an owner of the contaminated property. Nowhere in the trio of
statutes dealing with hazardous waste is there a definition of owner. Even
so, similar to CERCLA, the legislative history of title 13 suggests, that the
provisions of the statute should be generously construed by the courts
because cleaning up hazardous waste sites is so important to protecting
public health. 1" Therefore, the New York courts have interpreted title
13 to impose strict liability.31°
In a recent case,131 the Appellate Division, Third Department,
overturned the DEC's inactive hazardous waste disposal site

124. Id. § 27-1305(4)(b)(I)-(5).
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. § 27-1313(4).
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(2)-(3) (1988).
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1313(3).
See id. § 1301 (practice commentary).

130. See, e.g., State v. Schenectady Chem., Inc., 117 Misc. 2d 960, 459 N.Y.S.2d
971 (1983), aft'd, 103 A.D.2d 33, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1984).
131. New York State Superfund Coalition, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl.
Conservation, 144 A.D.2d 72, 536 N.Y.S.2d 886, aff'd, 75 N.Y.2d 88, 550 N.E.2d 155,
550 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1989).
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regulations132 dealing with liability under 'the Fund. The court held the
criteria for deciding whether hazardous waste at a site constitutes a
"significant threat to the environment," 133 created by the DEC to fill in
gaps in the legislation, were vague and overbroad, and contrary to the
intent of the legislature. 1" The court found that the list of subclass sites
which pose a significant threat was too broad because the regulation
requires only that the hazardous waste at a particular site hold the potential
for hazards to human health or the environment. 135 Under this standard,
every site where hazardous wastes exist would constitute a significant
threat, since hazardous waste always holds the "potential" for harm to
humans or the environment. 136 This decision appears beneficial to
lenders because it suggests that the courts will be reluctant to enforce title
13 as liberally as the DEC may have intended. The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed this ease. 37
The DEC, however, has responded to this setback by proposing a bill
to the New York State Assembly Legislative Commission on Toxic
Substances and Hazardous Wastes.138 In its current form, the bill
incorporates the challenged regulations in New York State Superfund
Coalition, making them part of the statutory scheme in title 13.139
B. Preemption by CERCLA
The United States Supreme Court has held that New Jersey's
hazardous waste legislation, financed by a tax on the oil and chemicals
industry, is preempted by CERCLA from being used for cleaning up sites
covered by the Superfund." 4 0 Although the New York State Legislature

132. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 375 (MeKinney 19E
133. Id. § 375(c).
134. Superfund Coalition, 144 A.D.2d at 76, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
135. Id., 536 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
136. Id., 536 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
137. New York State Superfund Coalition, Inc. v. New York State D
Conservation, 75 N.Y.2d 88, 550 N.E.2d 155, 550 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1989).
138. Governor Cuomo's Program Bill No. 133.
139. Id.
140. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 376 (1986) (the state fund n
pay for cleanup of oil spills not covered by CERCLA). The decision wa.
U.S.C. § 9614(c): "no person shall be required to contribute to any fund, t
which is to pay compensation for claims of any costs of response or dama
which may be compensated under this subchapter." Exxon Corp., 475 U.S.
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attempted to avoid the preemption problem,141 it was unnecessary

because of SARA. In enacting SARA, Congress implicitly overruled the
Court's decision in Exxon Corp. v. Hunt.142 Therefore, states are now

free to enact legislation that affects sites already covered under CERCLA.
C. New York Proposed Superlien Legislation
Many states, like New York, have enacted statutes governing the

disposal of hazardous waste by creating state superfunds. 143 State
superfund lien legislation authorizes the state environmental regulatory

agency to place a lien on the real and/or personal property of a person
found responsible for hazardous waste cleanup costs."

Most liens,

including CERCLA's," take their priority from the order in which they
are filed or recorded. Beyond this, five states currently have "superlien"
statutes. 14 Superliens give the state a priority lien on the contaminated
property to recover all costs of cleaning up the site, and supersede the

claims of all creditors with existing liens against the property. 147
Recently, a trend has developed away from superliens and is heading
towards the more moderate nonpriority liens. 4 At one time, seven
states had adopted superlien statutes, and many others had considered

implementing one. However, two of the seven, Arkansas and Tennessee,
141. See supra notes 112-30 and accompanying text.
142. SARA amended generally 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c), which had barred states from
imposing taxes or fees to pay costs covered by CERCLA. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
143. In addition to New York, 17 other states have such legislation: Arkansas,
Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
Witmer, Environmental Factors in Business and Real Estate Transactions, in
ENvIRONMENTAL DUE DIIGENCE, supra note 3, at 235.
144. See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
145. CERCLA's lien is not "super" because it is subject to the rights of any
purchaser, holder of a security interest, or judgment lien creditor whose interest is
perfected under applicable state law before notice of the federal lien has been filed. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(l)(3) (1988).
146. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
148. There are several possible reasons to explain this trend away from superliens.
First, lenders have mounted significant lobbying efforts to eliminate these laws. See Hamel,
supra note 19, at 853. Another possibility is that the superpriority is not needed with the
existence of CERCLA and similar state legislation. Additionally, superliens may do more
damage to the state in terms of tightening credit markets, than they do in financing
cleanups. Id.
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repealed
their superliens, leaving only a nonpriority environmental
1 49
lien.
In New York, a superlien bill was first introduced in 1986,1-'0 and
was reintroduced in 1987.151 Although the bill was unsuccessful, another
one was introduced in the 1988 legislative session.152 In 1988, the bill
passed in the Assembly, but not in the Senate. It was automatically
reintroduced during the current session"5 3 with some technical
corrections.
Under the current bill, whenever expenditures are incurred by the
Fund pursuant to New York State Finance Law section 97-b,'- 4 "the
state will be entitled to a lien upon the real and personal property of any
person from whom the state may recover . . . for any and all
expenditures." 55 The lien will be a superpriority lien and will take
precedence over all other claims against the contaminated property,
whether secured or unsecured.1 m In respect to the other property that
falls under the bill, the lien shall take precedence only over claims which
are subsequently perfected. 57 The lien will be for all the expenditures
plus interest, 15 and must be recorded to be effective. 59 Sources within
the New York DEC indicate that because of the budget and solid waste
issues, it is unlikely that serious attention will be paid to the bill until next
year.1 6°
The rationale behind the proposed legislation is to help the state to
recover money spent to remedy hazardous waste sites. 161 Also, by
strengthening the bargaining position of the DEC to secure voluntary

149. See id. at 855.
150. S. 7594, 1986 Sess., N.Y. State Legislature.
151. S. 2997, 1987 Sess., N.Y. State Legislature.
152. A. 6258, 1988 Sess., N.Y. State Legislature.
153. A. 5493, 1989 Sess., N.Y. State Legislature.
154. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 97-b (McKinney 1989).
155. A. 5493, 1989 Sess., N.Y. State Legislature (proposing adding subdivision 16
to N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 97-b.
156. N.Y STATE FIN. LAW § 16(a) (McKinney 1989).
157. Id. § 16(b).
158. Id. § 16(c).
159. Id. § 16(e).
160. Witmer, supra note 143, at 237.
161. A. 5493, 1989 Sess., N.Y. State Legislature, Memorandum in Support of
Legislation at 1.
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cleanup, there would be a reduction in demand made on the Fund. 162
Since the proposed superlien legislation in New York attaches to all
property of liable persons, the contaminated land may represent a small
portion of the liability. Consequently, lenders may be affected in two
ways. First, lenders who hold mortgages on the contaminated land may
lose the value of the collateral when it is superseded by a subsequent state
lien. Second, lenders who hold security interests in the other property of
responsible parties may lose their security if an unexpected state lien is
given priority. Kessler v. Tarrats," brought under the New Jersey Spill
Compensation and Control Act (SCC),'1 is illustrative of the latter
problem.
D. New Jersey Case Law
The SCC is similar to the New York bill in that the lien attaches to
both the contaminated property and any other property owned by the
responsible party."l ' The plaintiff in Kessler was the assignee of a
purchase money mortgage who instituted a suit to foreclose his
mortgage." However, the Administrator of the SCC moved for
summary judgment, claiming the lien for the cost of cleaning up the toxic
waste on the land took priority over the City of Patterson's tax lien,
Kessler's mortgage, and all other liens. 67 Kessler countered that since
the government was taking his property without paying just compensation
for it, the priority of the state's lien over his mortgage was
unconstitutional.'
The court held that the statute was a valid use of the state's police
power. 169 The court determined that the objectives of the City of
Patterson and the state were to stop an unlawful use of property and to

162. See id.
163. 191 N.J. Super. 273,466 A.2d 581 (1983), aff'd, 194 N.J. Super. 136, 476 A.2d
326 (1984).
164. N.J. REV. STAT. § 58:10-23.11 to :10-35.4 (1982 & Supp. 1990).
165. See id. § 58:10-23.1 lf(f). However, if the property consists of six dwelling units
or less, and is used exclusively for residential purposes, then it is exempt from the lien.
166. 191 N.J. Super. at281, 466 A.2d at 585.
167. Id., 466 A.2d at 585.
168. Plaintiff, Kessler, argued that the statute was unconstitutional for three reasons:
(1) it impaired the contract rights arising from the mortgage; (2) it deprived him of due
process of law because no notice to the prior lien interests had been required; and (3) it
would take his property without just compensation. Id., 466 A.2d at 585.
169. Id. at 288, 466 A.2d at 589.
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terminate a nuisance which was dangerous to life, health, and adjoining
properties. 70
The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of the lower court.17'
Again, the court noted the strong police power and public interest
rationale underlying the statute." In denying that there was an unlawful
taking of property, the court reasoned: "whatever property, if any, was
taken by the dischargers of the hazardous substances and not by the State
...
. [t]he State did not take property, but rather assisted in its
enhancement by doing what the owners should have done but did not

do. "173

In Kessler, the plaintiff lost his security because the state's lien was
given priority. As a result of the superlien attaching to all property of the
polluter, it is difficult in many circumstances for the lender, or anyone
with a security interest, to foresee an environmental lien attaching and
taking priority. Since New York's proposed superlien statute is similar to
New Jersey's, it is likely that the New York courts will look to the New
Jersey case law and arrive at similar results.
IV. ADvICE TO LENDERS
Due to the increased vulnerability under federal and state
environmental statutes, lenders must take precautions to protect
themselves. It is clear from both the statutes and case law that the lender
should identify borrowers that may pose problems to the environment, and
should be careful not to become involved in the borrower's daily business
affairs. 74 Generally, conducting an environmental audit is the best way
to determine future risks. 75 Furthermore, when dealing with
environmentally risky borrowers, lenders should take extra precautions
before foreclosing. Common sense dictates that a lender should not
foreclose if the cost of the cleanup is greater than the value of the
property.
Beyond this, there are other precautions a lender should
176
take.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 296, 466 A.2d at 595.
Kessler v. Tarrats, 194 N.J. Super. 136, 476 A.2d 326 (1984).
Id. at 146, 476 A.2d at 332.
Id. at 147, 476 A.2d at 332.
See supra notes 56-109 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.

176. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
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A. Investigation of the Property
The lender should treat the property as if it was being purchased by
the bank. The lender should go to the state environmental agency and
determine if the owner of the property has violated any environmental
laws. Furthermore, the lender can determine if the property is on, or on
its way to, the state's priority list."7 The lender can also conduct a
visual inspection of the property.
If the preliminary investigation indicates potential contamination, the
lender should have an environmental audit performed. The environmental
audit is the critical component of the environmental review process."'
Soil and groundwater samples should be taken and analyzed to determine
whether hazardous chemicals have been released on the property. The fact
that the property passes inspection at the time of the loan should not
preclude the lender from future tests to check for subsequent
contamination. 179
B. Indemnification Agreements and Covenants
CERCLA prevents the transfer of liability to the government.1"0 In
contrast, CERCLA allows indemnification agreements between private
parties. 18' The lender, however, should attempt to obtain them from a
parent corporation or individuals involved in the business, since
indemnification agreements are useless if the borrower is insolvent.
Equally important, are covenants between the lender and borrower,
The lender should require a covenant that neither the borrower, nor prior
owners (to the best of the borrower's knowledge), have created conditions
that may give rise to environmental liability, and that no enforcement
actions are pending or being threatened." The lender should also
compel the borrower to covenant that it will remedy any contamination
that occurs as soon as it is discovered, since this will always be less
expensive than waiting for the government to remedy the situation. In the

177. Manewitz, Environmental Due Diligence, in ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILuGENCE,
supra note 3, at 263.
178. Id. at 264.
179. Id. at 268.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988).
181. Id. § 9607(e)(2).
182. Klotz & Siakotos, Lender Liability Under Federal and State Environmental Law:
OfDeep Pockets, Debt Defeat and Deadbeats, 92 COMM. L.J. 275, 302 (1987).
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same vein, the borrower should also contract that it will comply with all
federal and state environmental laws. Finally, the borrower should agree
that the lender will be allowed to test and monitor the property.las
If such covenants are impossible to obtain, the lender should only give
recourse mortgages, and should obtain security interests in property the
borrower owns in states that do not have superlien statutes. 18 Moreover,
a breach of any of the covenants should be cause to accelerate the
underlying debt, allowing the lender to recover the loan proceeds before
a borrower's assets are expended or attached by a judgment or
superlien.'1
C. Proposed FederalLegislation to Protect Lenders
Legislation to protect small businesses and banks from liability was
reintroduced" by Rep. John J. LaFalce.' 7 However, passage does
not appear likely in the 101st Congress.' Witnesses from the banking,
small business, and legal professions told the committee that the
imposition of joint, several, and strict liability under CERCLA has had a
severe impact on small businesses. 18 9 Many banks, fearing liability as
deep-pocket defendants, now refuse to make loans to any small business
that has any possible relation to hazardous wastes.' 90
The original bill provided that commercial lenders foreclosing on real
estate to protect their security interests would not be construed as an
"owner or operator" under CERCLA. 191 The bill also would provide
that financial institutions that acquire contaminated property as a trustee
of an estate are not liable for the ensuing cleanup. 192 Rep. LaFalce said

183. Id.
184. Bleicher& Stonelake, Caveat Emptor: The Impact of Superfund and Related Laws
on Real Estate Transactions, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,017, 10,023 (1984).
185. Id. at 10,024.
186. H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990). The original was introduced last year,
H.R. 2085, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
187. John J. LaFalce (D-NY) is the chairman of the House Small Business Committee.
188. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 654, 654 (Aug. 11, 1989). House aides told BNA that the
proposed legislation has little chance of being enacted this year or next. However the
proposed legislation will be reintroduced again in the 102d Congress.
189. Id.
190. Id. (testimony of Charles M. Mitschow, representative of the American Bankers
Assoc.).
191. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 17, 17 (May 5, 1989).
192. Id.
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he added the provision limiting the liability of banks acting as corporate
trustees because they often do not know they will be named a trustee of
an estate until shortly before the will is offered for probate. 10 This does
not allow banks time to conduct environmental audits. The new bill will
expand protection to include public lenders, such as the Small Business
Administration, mortgage lenders, and charitable institutions. While
restating many of the same arguments he used for the original bill, 1
LaFalce also took into account a number of court opinions extending
CERCLA's liability scheme to lenders.195 Particularly, when discussing
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, " LaFalce claimed that the
case sent "shock waves through the financial community.""" Almost no
action occurred on LaFalce's original bill, except for an August 1989
hearing before his committee. 98
V. CONCLUSION

As the federal and state governments gradually became more aware
of the dangers that toxic waste presents to the public, they created the
Superfund and similar state funds to finance the cleanup of contaminated
sites. The government pursues the responsible parties through civil actions
to replenish the funds expended on a cleanup. Due to the gravity of the
problem and the tremendous amount of money needed to rectify it, the

liability schemes of the statutes are extremely broad, and as illustrated by
the case law, may encompass lending institutions.

While it is clear that lenders do not cause hazardous waste problems,
it is also becoming clear from the broad liability of CERCLA, that the
government is shifting some of the burden of policing hazardous waste to
lenders. After all, it is their financing that makes it possible for those
industries that do generate toxic waste to operate. It becomes a question
of where to place the cost for the cleanup. The government could place it
directly on society through taxes. This alternative, however, would
provide little incentive for industries creating hazardous waste to develop
cleaner methods of production or better methods of disposal. Lenders are
in a position to affect this situation by withholding financing from those

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1966, 1966 (Apr. 13, 1990).
See supra notes 58-109 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70-91 and accompanying text.
20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1966 (Apr. 13, 1990).

198. Id.
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that do not improve their production methods, effectively driving them out
of business.
Furthermore, while all of society benefits from a cleaner environment,
it may be argued that lenders directly benefit from CERCLA and similar
cleanups. The government's cleanup restores economic value to the
contaminated property. Additionally, the owner is protected from common
law actions resulting from the hazardous substances on the property. As
seen in the Maryland Bank & Trust decision, 1" a lender may be
considered an owner. On the state level, superliens prevent lenders from
enjoying the economic benefit of the states' cleanup at society's expense.
The case law is still developing in this area and remains very unsettled
at this point. A lender must obtain expert legal advice to stay abreast of
the developing standards which continue to be established. Those in New
York must also be aware of the implications the proposed superlien
legislation will have if enacted. A careful, informed lender does not have
to suffer economic losses at the hands of CERCLA, but may directly
contribute to a cleaner, healthier environment.
Robert F. Carangelo, Jr.

199. See supra notes 70-91 and accompanying text.

